Abstract. In this paper, the role of strategic forces in vertical relationships is examined. Using a simple model of differentiated products with symmetric demands and costs, the Perfect equilibrium to a vertical integration-vertical separation game between manufacturers is determined. Given the assumptions of the model, I show that the manufacturer's decision whether to vertically integrate or to remain separate from its retailer depends on the degree of product differentiation. I show that when the products are poor substitutes, the only Perfect equilibrium is vertical integration by both manufacturers. As the products become closer substitutes, an additional Perfect equilibrium appears, both firms vertically separated. For manufacturers, the vertically separated equilibrium always Pareto dominates the vertical integration equilibrium when both equilibria exist.
I.

Introduction
This paper extends the analysis of strategic considerations in vertical relationships by considering the decision between vertical integration and vertical separation on the part of manufacturers. 1 Vertical separation is defined as selling through an independent retailer, as opposed to selling directly to consumers. Using a simple model of differentiated products with symmetric demands and costs, I show that when the products are close substitutes there are multiple Perfect equilibria to a vertical integration-vertical separation game between manufacturers; both firms vertically separated and both firms vertically integrated. The vertically separated equilibrium always Pareto dominates the vertical integration result when multiple Perfect equilibria exist. When the products are relatively poor substitutes, the only Perfect equilibrium involves vertical integration by both firms. A mixed outcome, in which an integrated firm competes against an independent manufacturer and retailer is never a Perfect equilibrium in this model.
The intuition behind these results is the following. Manufacturers in the decision to raise their price to retailers face two conflicting forces. If they raise their price they exacerbate the double markup problem.
That is, sales of the manufacturer's product are reduced below the desired level by an additional markup at the retail level if retailers have market power. However, manufacturers also obtain a strategic benefit from having other manufacturers raise their prices in response. This occurs if manufacturing and retail prices are strategic complements which is the case if the goods are substitutes and price competition exists at both stages. The relative strengths of these forces depends on the degree of product differentiation. When the products are poor substitutes, the adverse effect of the double markup problem overwhelms the benefit from having competitors also raise their price. In this case, vertical integration, which results in the manufacturing price being passed through at cost, is the dominant strategy for manufacturers. When the products are relatively close substitutes, the double markup problem is more than offset by the strategic benefit obtained from having the rival manufacturer and retailer raise their prices.
There are a number of papers which address similar issues in vertical control. Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Gal-Or (1991) emphasize the strategic nature of price competition when products are differentiated. Fershtman and Judd (1987) show that for the case of Bertrand-price competition with differentiated products, owners want their managers to set a high price to elicit higher prices from competing managers. Owners will therefore choose an incentive structure that overcompensates the manager for increasing price at the margin. Gal-Or (1991) finds that when products produced by manufacturers are only 2 slightly differentiated, producers may benefit from the double marginalization which results from linear pricing. In her model, retailers are in perfectly elastic supply which implies that manufacturers can extract all profits from them. Gal-Or does not address the vertical integration-vertical separation decision. Rey and Stiglitz (1988) , on the other hand, consider the strategic effect of exclusive territories on inter-brand competition (ie. competition among producers). In a model with many retailers, they show that in contrast to the case of perfect competition at the retail level, the imposition of exclusive territories eliminates intrabrand competition and therefore allows each retailer to enjoy some monopoly power over a fixed fraction of the final demand for his product. They show that exclusive territories may serve to facilitate collusion when imperfect competition exists among producers. They find that with exclusive territories joint profits are higher, but overall surplus is reduced.
More directly related to the analysis contained here, Bonanno and Vickers (1988) demonstrate in a duopolistic market that vertical separation is more profitable for both manufacturers than a vertically integrated equilibrium if franchise fees are used to extract the retailer's surplus (Proposition 1). They define vertical separation as the manufacturer raising its price above marginal cost and levying a franchise fee which extracts all profits from retailers. They assume there is perfect competition between potential retailers, which coupled with a franchise fee transfers all profits to the manufacturers. Thus, the double markup effect is inoperative in their model. Finally, uses a model of zero-one demands and obtains two Nash equilibria in a vertical separation-vertical integration game between manufacturers. The Nash equilibria are vertical integration by both firms and vertical separation by both firms. This result will be contrasted with the results obtained here.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the simple model of differentiated products used in the analysis while section III outlines the game considered in the paper. Section IV derives the outcomes which are possible given the structure of the game; these are vertical integration by both firms, vertical separation by both firms, and a mixed outcome, one manufacturer vertically separated and one manufacturer vertically integrated, respectively. The section also contains a discussion of the strategic nature of vertical integration. Section V investigates the Perfect equilibrium to the vertical separation-vertical integration decision on the part of manufacturers. Section VI contrasts the results in this paper with those in .
II. The Model
The model involves a continuum of consumers of the same type with a utility function separable and linear in the numeraire good. 2 That is, a two sector model is assumed, one competitive, which acts as a numeraire, the other monopolistic, comprised of two firms. 3 The representative consumer maximizes W 4 This is also the region of quantity space where prices are positive. Given >0, this implies the restriction (ß-)>0 for the intercept a to be positive. 5 By assumption, b>0, and if the goods are substitutes an additional parameter restriction exists, c>0, since >0 if the goods are substitutes.
Singh and Vives (1984) argue that when the intercepts of the demand functions are equal as is here, the sign and magnitude of the parameter =c 2 /b 2 characterizes the relationship between the goods. The goods are substitutes, complements, or independent depending on whether is greater, less than, or equal to 0. In this paper, only the cases of substitutes and independent goods will be considered, which means that is constrained to the interval [0,1]. 6 That is, we are interested in characterizing differing degrees of product substitutability. A particular feature of this model is that the homogenous good Bertrand model emerges as a special case, when = 1.
Independent retailers are assumed to choose p i , the retail price to maximize,
, where m i is the manufacturing price and s i is the retail selling cost which has been set equal to zero with no loss in generality. Manufacturers, on the other hand, choose m i , their manufacturing price, to maximize
, where k i , is average and marginal cost of production, which has also been set to zero, for convenience. It is also assumed that there are no fixed costs of production at either the retail or manufacturing stage. 7 Initially, I assume that franchise fees are not used.
In the next section, the type of game considered in this paper is presented.
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III. The Timing of the Game
In this section, the decision faced by manufacturers in the setting envisioned here is illustrated. It is assumed that manufacturers are faced with the decision to vertically integrate or remain separate. The precise moves involved can be illustrated with the following timing line. It is important to discuss the implications of assuming the above sequence of decisions. The game described here involves manufacturers deciding to compete directly in the retail market or to sell through retailers. For the latter case, it is assumed that manufacturers choose their prices anticipating correctly the retail outcome. That is, vertically separated manufacturers choose their prices, simultaneously, assuming that retail prices will be set through Bertrand-Nash competition between independent retailers. Independent manufacturers know, therefore, that their manufacturing prices, already set above production cost, will be marked up again at the retail level given that no vertical restraints are used.
An important issue to decide is a sensible sequence of actions for the mixed outcome, that is competition between an integrated manufacturer and an independent retailer and manufacturer. In this paper, I argue that consistent with the vertical separation outcome, the manufacturing price of the separated firm should be chosen, prior to the retail competition. This is the same timing as found in . A game in which the retail prices for the integrated firm and independent retailer are set simultaneously with the manufacturing price of the independent manufacturer is not considered for the following reason.
Simultaneous determination would imply retailers setting prices independent of their input prices, a rather odd situation. Moreover, given that its retailer would not respond to changes in manufacturing prices, this would imply that the optimal price for the manufacturer would be infinite, an unstable result.
IV. Vertical Integration, Vertical Separation and Mixed Outcome
Vertical Integration Outcome
Each integrated firm chooses a retail price to maximize total profits which can be expressed as for firm 2 respectively, which intersect at point I which is the retail Nash equilibrium for the two integrated firms.
[ Figure 2 here]
The slopes and intercepts of the reaction functions depend on the degree of product differentiation with the reaction functions becoming perpendicular as the goods become more independent. Their solution yields the equilibrium retail price for the integrated firms, P I *= a/(2b-c). Given that a>0, this implies a restriction for positive prices of c<2b. This is also the restriction that the reaction functions, also called best reply mappings, be contractions. 8 The outcome for the case of noncooperative vertically integrated firms is summarized below. for substitutes, the comparison depends on the signs of [(2b-c)] and (b-c). For the existence of a Nash equilibrium in price space, a necessary restriction is that c<2b. For a positive collusive price, c must be less than b, or given the definition of product differentiation, must be less than 1. Thus the noncooperative vertical integration price is less than the collusive vertical integration price. This implies there is an incentive for manufacturers to pursue higher retail prices.
Vertical Separation Outcome
In the vertically separated equilibrium both retailers are independent. Each retailer chooses its price to maximize, Each manufacturer is then assumed to choose m i simultaneously, i=1,2 to maximize, M i = m i q i , anticipating correctly that the retail outcome will be determined by Bertrand-Nash competition between retailers. Substituting the Bertrand-Nash prices into the demand functions yields the respective In this model, the independent manufacturer chooses m 2 to maximize M 2 = (m 2 -k 2 ) q 2 , assuming, correctly, that the retail outcome will be determined by price competition between the independent retailer and the integrated firm. Evaluating q 2 at the asymmetric retail outcome, the first order condition can be solved to yield the optimal manufacturing price, m 2 *=[a(2b+c)]/2(2b 2 -c 2 ). Once m 2 * is substituted into P 1 MI * and P 2 MNI * the quantities and profits can be determined. The complete mixed outcome is presented below.
8 Before the Perfect equilibrium for the complete game is considered, it is useful to examine the mixed outcome in more detail. In particular the strategic implications of a vertically integrated manufacturer competing against an independent retailer.
Proposition 1.
For symmetric costs and demands; integration by one firm provides it with a strategic advantage for the range 0< <1. That is, the mixed equilibrium results in higher profits for the integrated firm than the combined profits of the independent retailer and independent manufacturer.
Proof: See Appendix.
Integration allows the firm to maintain a lower retail price when products are differentiated and these lower prices translate into higher sales for the integrating firm. 10 This proposition shows that for the specific demand and cost functions used, integration by one firm provides it with a strategic advantage. In this model, vertical integration is a credible commitment to a more aggressive retail pricing strategy. That is, eliminating the double markup allows the integrating firm to maintain a lower retail price while receiving a substantial pecuniary benefit from the higher retail price set by the independent retailer. The retail price set by the independent retailer involves a markup over the price set by the independent manufacturer.
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V. The Perfect Equilibrium to the Complete Game
Using the associated profit functions, it is straightforward to determine the nature and existence of the Perfect equilibria to the game played between manufacturers. For the case of perfect substitutes, profits are zero for all firms, for the three respective outcomes. This is a natural result of Bertrand competition with identical goods. When the demands are independent for the two goods, each manufacturer is a monopolist.
In this case, it is not clear whether the mixed outcome case applies, since strategic issues have little relevance when considering independent manufacturers. Without the mixed outcome case, we are left with two outcomes for each independent firm, vertical integration and vertical separation. Of more general interest is the case of less than perfect substitutes, 0< <1.
Proposition 2. (a)
There is a critical value of , *=.867, such that for symmetric costs and demands: (i) there is a single Perfect equilibrium, both firms integrating, for the range of product differentiation < *; (ii) there are multiple Perfect equilibria, both firms integrating and both firms separated, for a range of *< <1.
(b) When both Perfect equilibria exist, manufacturers earn higher profits in the Vertical Separation equilibrium than in the Vertical Integration equilibrium.
Proposition 2 is solved numerically to determine the nature and existence of the Perfect equilibria.
Vertical Integration by both firms is always a Perfect equilibrium for 0< <1. Furthermore, Vertical
Integration by both firms is the only Perfect equilibrium when the products are poor substitutes. The Mixed
Outcome is not a Perfect Equilibrium in this symmetric model. 12 As the goods become closer substitutes, a second Perfect equilibrium, Vertical Separation by both firms appears. The Vertical Separation equilibrium only exists when the products are fairly close substitutes. Given this result, it is useful to compare manufacturer profits in the two equilibria.
For degrees of product differentiation greater than the critical * but less than 1, a search over the range .867< <1 reveals that profits for manufacturers are higher under the Vertical Separation equilibrium than under the Vertical Integration equilibrium. The intuition for this result is as follows. As the goods become closer substitutes, the strategic effect plays a more important role than the double markup problem.
The reason is that the percentage markup (P VS* -m VS* )/m VS* shrinks as the goods become closer substitutes. 13 Thus, the adverse effect of the double markup problem is reduced. Given that higher retail prices move the outcome closer to the collusive outcome for the two firms, the Vertical Separation equilibrium is preferred to the Vertical Integration equilibrium.
The above results have been based on the assumption that manufacturers were restricted to a linear price schedule. As observed by Rey and Stiglitz, if the manufacturers anticipate the retail price equilibrium, it is possible for them to recover the retailers profits by the use of a franchise fee. 14 It is important to realize that manufacturers do not want to reduce the double marginalization which arises in the vertical separation outcome by charging retailers marginal cost for their supplies. This would eliminate the strategic effect which has been shown to raise the profits of manufacturers over the vertically integrated Nash equilibrium. I have shown, in the context of this model, that the only effect the introduction of franchise fees has is to make the second Nash equilibrium, Vertical Separation by both firms, appear at a lower degree of substitutability between the products.
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The reason is that the vertical separation payoffs are now higher for both manufacturers reducing the incentive to vertically integrate, unilaterally, at all intermediate degrees of product differentiation.
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VI. Conclusion
It is important to contrast these results with those in . One major difference is related to the type of product differentiation used in the models. Lin considers a model in which a randomly chosen consumer values the products of the two manufacturers at v x and v y , whose difference (v x -v y ) is uniformly distributed on the interval [-0.5,0.5]. The number of consumers is normalized to 1. In his model, the consumer either buys one unit of the product from x or y, or does not buy at all. 16 The demand functions are given as q x =.5-p x +p y ; and q y =.5+p x -p y , respectively. Lin's model would be described as a case of perfect substitutes in our framework. Thus, the two models of product differentiation not directly comparable.
However, given the assumptions in , his model can be properly interpreted as a differentiated products model but of a different sort. 17 The second major difference is that the Lin model assumes that the total demand for the product is constant in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium. He asserts that "if demand is not sufficiently inelastic, our result may have to be altered." 18 This formulation gives a bias towards equilibria with higher prices since the adverse demand effect resulting from the double markup problem is absent. In contrast, our demand specification allows us to consider a range of demand elasticities. Proposition 2. Proof: The first step is to see whether the mixed outcome could be an equilibrium to the game.
The condition i I / i MNI > 1 implies that if one manufacturer is integrated it will pay the other manufacturer to integrate. Thus if this condition holds the mixed outcome cannot be an equilibrium. Using the profit functions, performing the division and cancelling terms, yields the equivalent condition 4H > (2b-c)(2b+c),
